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ENDORSEMENT OF CHECKS.
Ever since Price v. Neal, 3 Burr,
1354 (1762), litigation growing out of the respective rights of the
banker, the depositor, and the endorsee of a check or draft, has
been constantly growing. The latest development is seen in the
recent amendment made by the various Clearing House Associations
of the country to their rules concerning the attitude of the Associations toward checks bearing qualified or restrictive endorsements,
such as "for collection," or "for account of."
There is no doubt that the relation between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor and creditor, unless the relation is changed
by statute or by the charter of the bank. There is a quasi-contractual obligation on the part of the bank to disburse the money
standing to the depositor's credit only upon his order, and in conformity with his directions. Payments made upon forged endorsements are at the peril of the bank, unless it can claim protection
upon some principle of estoppel, or by reason of some negligence
chargeable to the depositor: Shiminan v. Bank, 126 N. Y., , 19i.

(1891).
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But in controversies arising between the bank and the endorsee
to whom the bank has made payment, the rule is less stringent.
Such endorsee cannot recover through the medium of a forged
endorsement. If there is a forged endorsement, title has not
passed, so that the payment was made under a mistake of fact, and
in general may be recovered by the bank, though the endorsee to
whom payment was made be a bonajifle holder for value: Ganal
Between
Bank v. Bank ofAlbany, i Hill (N. Y.), 29o (1841).
the depositor and the endorsee to whom the bank pays, no question
can arise. The drawer is not presumed to know the signature of
the payee. The bank must, at its own peril, determine that question and the burden is rightly placed, for all the means of determining this are within its power, both by absolute endorsement and
by identification.
The question which recently arose in -NationalPark Bank v.
Seaboard !Viational Bank, grew out of a draft sent to defendant
bank by the Eldred Bank, endorsed, "For collection for account
Defendant was the New York corof Eldred Bank, Eldred, Pa."
respondent of the Eldred Bank, and upon receiving the draft,
presented it through the New York Clearing House to plaintiffthe drawee-for payment. The amount of the draft had been
raised from eight dollars to eighteen hundred dollars. Plaintiff,
through a mistake of facts, paid this amount. Defendant paid
the proceeds to the Eldred Bank, who in turn paid its principal,
the payee of the draft. Twenty-one days after it was paid by the
Eldred Bank, plaintiff first learned of the alteration in the draft,
when it immediately notified defendant of its mistake and demanded
repayment. Beyond the failure to detect the alteration when the
draft was presented to plaintiff, there was no negligence in the case.
The court concluded that defendant "never had any title, ownerPlaintifi
ship, interest or property in or to said check or draft."
knew from the endorsement that it was dealing with an agent, and
could not recover from the agent who had paid to its principal
without notice. It is clear that no other conclusion could have
been reached.
The amendment to the Clearing House Rules will materially
protect its members and aid in placing such losses where they belong.
NEGLI;ENcE-LE;AL REsPONSIIuILITY OF BATH-HOUSE PROPRIETOR.
In the case of Brothert/on v. Aanhattan Beach mnproz'e-

ment C'ompanl, 67 N. W. Rep. 479, which was brought before the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in May, 1896, the evidence showed
that Brotherton, a youth of seventeen years of age, together with
one Campion, both residing in Omaha, went together, on the 8th
day of August, 1892, to Lake Manawa, a summer resort in Iowa.
There is on the shore of this lake an establishment maintained by
the defendant company for the purpose of affording facilities to
bathers. There are bath-houses, toboggan slides in the water, a
platform for diving, and it seems also certain other resorts on the
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shore, such as a restaurant, a photograph gallery, and a shooting
gallery. These privileges are let out to the public by the defendant
company for hire. Brotherton and Campion paid the customary
fee for bathing privileges, put on bathing suits and entered the
water, both being able to swim. Perhaps more than three quarters
of an hour after entering the water, Campion was unable to find
Brotherton and a search was instituted among the bathers. He was
not found, and his loss was reported, which resulted in a more
thorough search, through which his dead body was discovered about
ten o'clock that night, at the bottom of the lake. The plaintiff,
the administratrix of Brotherton, brought suit against the Manhattan Beach Improvement Company, alleging negligence on the
part of the defendant in failing to provide suitable guards and
notices whereby the depth of the water should be indicated ; in
failing to provide proper management to superintend bathing; and
in failing to provide means for resuscitating persons overcome by
strangulation or otherwise while in the water ; and further that noperson was present, on behalf of the defendant, to search for or
recover Brotherton immediately upon his *disappearance from the
surface of the water. A verdict was rendered by the jury in thelower court for the defendant, under instructions by the Court, and
an appeal having been taken by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court
held that the case presented an issue which should have been submitted to the jury, saying:
"We think that it is a reasonable inference that persons of
ordinary prudence, conducting a bathing resort frequented by ten
thousand people a month, should, in the exercise of ordinary care,
keep some one on duty to supervise bathers and rescue any apparently in danger; and, if not, that it is certainly a reasonable inference that persons so situated should, on ascertaining that a person
last seen in the water is missing-without a moment's delay-exert
every effort to search for that person in the water, and not merely
advise a youthful companion of the missing person to search on the
land, and coolly watch the result of such search. We think, in this
aspect of the case, and this only, the evidence presented an issue
which should have been submitted to the jury, and for that reason
the peremptory instruction was erroneous."
The conclusion reached by the Court is a difficult one to sustain
upon legal principles. Surely no authority exists, indeed none was
apparently presented to the Court, which carries the responsibility
of one individual for the actions of another to such an unwarranted
extent. The contract into which the parties entered was a simple
one ; the defendant company agreeing to furnish bathing robes to
the plaintiff's intestate in consideration of the payment of a small
fee. To read into this an implied guaranty that the defendant
would supervise the bathers and rescue any apparently in langer,
and would diligently search for missing ones, is to make the
contract for the parties and to reach a result which the legislature
alone, if at any time it deems such a measure advantageous, can
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properly attain. While it may be eminently desirable that bathers
should be as far as possible protected from the dangers into which
they necessarily place themselves, it seems improper to thrust the
burden of protecting and guarding them upon a defendant who
merely in return for a small fee supplies them with garments.
INTERPRETATION OF WILL.

In Conway's Estate, Legal Intelli-

gencer, vol. 53, P. 237, it has recently been decided by the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, evenly
divided, that the expression "spinster or unmarried nieces," used
by a testator, should include nieces who had been married, but
who were widows at the time of the testator's death.
By a codicil to his will a testator had bequeathed his residuary
estate to his "spinster or unmarried nieces."
It appeared that
there were living at the date of the execution of the codicil, and
also at the time of his death, both spinster nieces and nieces who.
had been married, but were then widows. The argument in
favor of including the widowed nieces from participation in the
estate was based on the idea that the will disclosed a purpose to use
the words in question synonymously. By the words "spinster
nieces," those who were single and had never married were
undoubtedly intended. To provide for this class exclusively was.
the evident primary intention of the testator. But did he mean to
enlarge the class when he added the words "or unmarried?"
The dissenting opinion took the point of view that these latter
words were used in a sense exactly identical with and equivalent
to the words "spinster nieces; " that the testator. being fearful
that his meaning might be misunderstood, added the other words
so that the class intended might be specified more clearly. It
appeared, also, in another provision in the will, that the testator
described a legatee as "Mary or -amie Bradley," meaning one
and the same person, and from this clue it was argued that the
expression "spinster or unmarried" disclosed a corresponding use
of the disjunctive "or,"
and that, therefore, the words "or
unmarried" should be construed in the sense that they merely
defined and explained the testator's meaning in dcscribing his
nieces as "spinsters. ''
On the other hand, it was argued that, bearing in mind the
well-established rule of interpretation, giving effect, it possible, to
every word in a will, some meaning must be attached to the word
"unmarried."
The testator had a niece living at the time of his
death who was not a spinster, because she had been married, but
who was then unmarried, because her husband had died and she
had not remarried. In order to exclude her from sharing in the
estate, it would be necessary to hold the word "unmarried," which
precisely designated her, redundant and meaningless. The Pennsylvania courts have always held that "unmarried women " means
not only those who are not and have never been married, but also
those who, having been married, have become widows and remained
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such: Conmmonwealth v. Powell, 51 Pa. 440 ; Roadgers v. Rodgers,
7 Watts, i9; Schaeffer's AA."eal, 8 Pa. 4o; Dale v. Dale, i Harris, 446; Fahsv. Fahs, 6 Watts, 214; and hence the expression
" or unmarried" cannot be considered a mere tautology, because
it distinctly designates a class which is certainly not included in
the word "spinster."
The court, evenly divided, held that the
disjunctive "or"
applied simply to the adjectives, and that the
testator's intention in using the expression "spinster or unmarried
nieces" was the same as if he had said " my nieces, spinster or
unmarried;" and that as spinster meant those who had never been
married, so the word "unmarried" included those who had been
married but were then widows, and hence both'classes should share.
Without entering into the etymological meaning of the word
"unmarried," or its significance in the common vernacular, it is
beyond dispute that, in its legal acceptation, the term includes
women who have been married, but who are at present widows.
So that, with this point conceded, and the circumstances of the
case presenting facts which would, unless effect were given to the
words in question, make them mere surplusage, it is certainly
consistent with principle and precedent to hold that the phrase
"spinster or unmarried nieces" includes not only nieces who were
never married, but also nieces who had been married but were
widows at the death of the testator.
CHARITABLE BEQUEST-TRUST TO MAINTAIN DONOR'S MONUMENT.
In Smithl's Estate, 53 Legal Intelligencer, 236, the testator

bequeathed a portion of his estate in trust to erect, maintain, and
repair, in Fairmount Park, Philadelphia, a monumental memorial
to certain heroes of the Civil War, to bear their statues in bronze,
and also the testator's statue and a mural tablet inscribed with his
name. The validity of the trust was disputed on the ground that it
was a violation of the rule against perpetuities. Manifestly this was
true, unless the bequest was a charity; and the majority of the
court finally upheld its validity on that ground, holding that the
purpose of the gift determined the question as to whether it was a
charity. What then was its purpose ? The testator directs that the
mural tablet shall be inscribed with these words: "This monumental arch presented by Richard Smith, type founder of Philadelphia, in memory of Pennsylvanians who took part in the civil
war; " and he designates by name those whose statues are to be
placed upon the arch. If his purpose was simply to commemorate
these individuals, as stated in the will, then, as the dissenting
minority of the court says, " the trust lacks the essential element of
indefiniteness, which is one of the characteristics of a legal charity."
But the majority held, probably arguing from the character of the
memorial, according to the familiar rule that a man is presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his acts, that its object was the
beautifying and adornment of the city's great pleasure resort, for
the elevation and refinement of the people, the cultivation of their
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love for the beautiful, and the stimulation of patriotism; and that
it was therefore a charity. This is in accordance with Chief Justice's Gray's statement, in J7ackson v. Phillis, 1 Allen, 556, that
'lit
is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the
gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its
nature."
In England a trust to maintain the donor's monument or tomb is
not considered charitable unless the monument is within a church
as one of the decorations of the building, since otherwise it is copsidered to benefit no one but the donor. In this country, as a
rule, such a trust is sustained as a charity: 3 Amer. En. Lawy, 132 ;
Jones v. Habersham, 17 Otto, 174; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen
(Mass.) 243 ; Szaseir v. Amer. Bible Soc., 57 Mfe. 523 ; Act of
May 26, 1891 (Penna.), P. L. 1i9. Such bequests are generally
held valid on the ground of their being in performance of religious
duties; but in the present case no such duty existed, so the trust
could be considered charjtble only because of its educational
purpose.
The fact that the motive of the testator in this case was partly
to perpetuate his own name and the names of his wife and son, did
not, in the opinion of the court, diminish the value or charitable
character of his gift. In Jones v. Habersham, sqsra, one of the
trusts created was for the establishment and maintenance of a public
library to bear in a conspicuous manner the name of the testatrix.
This was held a valid charity, the court saying: "The directions
tending to perpetuate the memory of the founder do not impair its
public character or its legal validity."
And in -ire Insurance
Patrolv. Bo,d, 120 Pa. 624, the court asserted the test that " the
motive of the benefactor is of no moment and is not to be sought
after, but the purpose and object of the gift determinfs its character
as religious, charitable pr otherwise.

